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IMPLEMENTING COMPREHENSIVE BANKING
UNDER SEC JURISDICTION: A WORKABLE
SOLUTION TO BANK REFORM
The recent collapse of the savings and loan industry' has prompted Congress
to reevaluate its decision to continue deregulating the banking industry. Many
members of Congress now feel that the loose leash under the Reagan years has
led to increased financial woes, instead of creating new and ambitious opportu-
nities. While this skepticism is understandable, it is an insufficient reason for
Congress to avoid accepting, at least in theory, the Bush Administration's
invitation to lower barriers between commercial and investment banking.2 Dif-
ferences between the savings and loan and the national banking industries begin
to shed light on the reasons for Congress to reform the Glass-Steagall Act ("the
Act"),3 the barrier between commercial and investment banking. Moreover, sound
economic and legal reasons offer Congress the impetus to take the bull by the
horns and wrestle down the problems the banking industry faces because of
scarcely applied prohibitions under the Act.4
Unfortunately, the key issue Congress faces to institute "comprehensive
banking" 5 is a political one. The ability of Congress to act before the 1992
presidential. election depends, to a large extent, on the Bush Administration's
1. The problems that stem from the savings and loan failures have had a broad impact on
many elements of the financial services industry. Consequently, "securities industry officials say they
realize that Congress will not be in the mood to consider a massive reform proposal. Nonetheless,
the same officials express frustration with the unwillingness of bank regulators to hold off on
regulatory actions that further break down Glass-Steagall barriers." Congressional Agenda: Stalemate
May Derail Comprehensive Banking Reform, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 13, at S-9 (Jan. 18,
1991) [hereinafter Stalemate in Reform]. The Bush Administration, however, has set forth an aggressive
agenda of further bank reforms which are designed to spur Congress to enact legislation that treats
the ills of the banking industry instead of letting them get worse.
2. DEPARTmENT OF THE TREAsuzy, MoDERNIZNo THE FiNANcIAL SYsTEm: Recommendations for
Safer, More Competitive Banks, Part XVIII (February 1991) [hereinafter TRasuRy REPORT]. The
Treasury's report addressed a four part problem:
(1) reduced bank competitiveness and financial strength, caused by outdated legal
restrictions that have prevented banking organizations from responding to the evolution
of financial markets and technology; (2) the overextension of deposit insurance [exces-
sively exposing taxpayers] ...; (3) a fragmented regulatory system that has created
duplicative rules ... ; and (4) an undercapitalized deposit insurance fund.
Id. at ix, Executive Summary (emphasis in original). The first problem, so indicated is the focus of
this note: should banks be allowed to engage in currently prohibited capital market activities under
the regulatory structure of the SEC.
3. The Glass-Steagall Act [hereinafter the Act] comprises a number of sections of the United
States Code in Title 12. The primary sections involve: (1) Section 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(1988), (general powers of national banks); (2) Section 20, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988), (prohibitions of
bank affiliations with securities organizations); (3) Section 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378a (1988), (prohibits
securities firms from receiving deposits and carrying on other banking activities); and (4) Section 32,
12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988), (disallows certain persons from being officers, directors or employees of
Federal Reserve member banks).
4. See, e.g., Fischer, Gram, Kaufman & Mote, The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. Rzv. 467 (1984) [hereinafter Fischer & Mote].
5. As used hereinafter, the term "comprehensive banking" refers to the merger of commercial
and investment banking currently proscribed by the Act. This term has been used by other commen-
tators and the author adopts it as a convenient reference (citations omitted).
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willingness to expend enough political capital to pass reforms now. 6 While this
element of the equation is uncertain, recent proposals by the Administration,
together with Congress' enactment of the Securities Enforcement Remedies Act
("SERA") 7 indicate that the time is ripe for Congress to institute comprehensive
banking legislation. 8 While it is necessary to revive the banking industry from
the severe blows it took as a result of the savings and loan debacle, it is also
critical for the United States' financial industry, as well as the economy as a
whole, to resume new growth. This growth should be spurred by a strong and
ambitious banking industry which has secured the goodwill of the American
public. Thus, comprehensive banking offers the competition and diversity for
American banks, as well as the entire financial industry, to trigger new growth
and freedom in financial services which will also recapture their role as world
players. 9
The opening of the European Community in 1992 is another impetus for
Congress to overhaul the American banking system and allow commercial banks
with a substantial capital base to engage in banking and underwriting.10 The
Treasury Report outlines the fact that many EC countries operate under a
regulatory structure absent the type of restrictions in the Act." Since activities
by world banks will continue to grow in this area, American banks will be at a
considerable competitive disadvantage in the world financial market. The consen-
6. The strength of the opposition in Congress stems from the notion that "[m]any consider
Glass-Steagall reform a fail accompli, particularly since the [Board] already has approved limited
corporate debt and equity powers for [sic] some of the nation's biggest BHCs. Seidman said, in his
opinion, the Glass-Steagall issue is one of the least important matters pending in the debate at this
point, since regulators already have acted to expand bank securities powers." See, Stalemate in
Reform. supra note I at S-9. It is likely, however, that if Bush pushes hard enough, he should get
most of his reform proposals through Congress. Id. at S.
7. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The full title is the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, but since the Act is divided
into two parts, the enforcement part and penny stock reform part, I will only refer to it as the
Securities Enforcement Remedies Act.
8. The idea to broaden bank powers has previously been on the blocks. See The Proxmire
Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CoNG. REc. 3360-3437
(1988) [hereinafter Proxmire Act]. In the recent proposals for reform, however, the Bush Adminis-
tration is seeking a wide range of reforms including greatly expanded bank securities powers. Stalemate
in Reform, supra note 1 at S-5. The Securities Industry Association ("SIA") has also offered a
proposal to allow banks into the securities business provided "banks do not use federally insured
deposits to subsidize the bank's efforts. Id. at S-9. The essence of the SIA proposal is the separate
affiliate concept or the separate subsidiary concept currently embraced by the Federal Reserve Board
in its recent approvals of some bank holding company subsidiaries securities activities. See infra note
16. See also SEcuRurUs INDusTRY AssocIAToN, QUESTIONING EXPANDED BA PowERS: A Case for
Maintaining the Fundamental Separation Between the Banking and Securities Industries (1985)
[hereinafter EXPANDED B~AN PowRs].
9. J.P. MORoAN & Co., INc., RnHmwo GLw-STEAGAIL 38 (1984) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan].
10. The Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter '33 Act] defines underwriter to include "any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking[.J" 15 U.S.C. 77b(l1) (1990). This definition also includes control persons within those
who are issuers. Id.
11. TaRAsutrY REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII- 25, citing Am. Bankers A., International Banking
Competitiveness, op. cit., 72, 82 (1990).
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sus is that "the action the EC has taken [with the Second Banking Directive]
would be comparable to the removal of Glass-Steagall, McFadden, the Bank
Holding Company Act, and many state laws and regulations in the United
States.'" 2
Since softening of the Act does not require complete repeal, a carefully
drawn regulatory scheme updating the prohibitions will help rejuvenate the
banking industry without sacrificing the fundamental goals of the Act: to prevent
banks from using their bank assets in "imprudent securities" activities and
protect banks from the "subtle hazards" that arise when a commercial bank
enters the investment banking forum. 3 But change in the regulation of commercial
banks-allowing securities law to govern banks' securities activities and banking
law to govern banks' traditional banking activities-represents a fundamental
shift in regulatory philosophies. The primary purpose of banking law is to protect
the depositor and the bank industry, including the public.' 4 Consequently, the
regulatory perspective focuses on protection and stability. To allow banks to
engage in securities activities on a broad scale would introduce the need for
regulation from the point of view of the "equityholder" because the focus is on
"encourag[ing] banks to engage in additional risk taking to improve profitability
and to diversify activities as a hedge against risk."' 5 The Federal Reserve Board
("Board") already operates to some degree in this mindset; as evidence by their
recent approvals of bank holding company subsidiaries to engage in limited
underwriting.' 6 The proper regulatory perspective to channel new competitive
banking activities in the capital markets, however, should fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") since its regulatory point
of view is of the "equityholder" or investor.
This note takes the position that comprehensive banking is now appropriate,
and demonstrates how such an objective can be achieved through a unique
combination of securities and banking laws. Part I provides an historical overview
of modern banking law, including an analysis of the Act and why it was written
in such a prohibitory manner. Part II discusses recent developments in securities
law that strongly suggest both the legal and financial communities' amiableness
to comprehensive banking. Furthermore, this part scrutinizes SERA and examines
12. TREAsuRy REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-26, quoting Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, op. cit., at 343.
13. See Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 66 (1981) [hereinafter ICI],
and Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 (U.S. 617, 630-31 (1971) [hereinafter Camp].
14. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory
Age, 57 FoRDHAn L. REv. 501, 504 (1989).
15. Id. at 505.
16. See Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., and Bankers Trust Ne York Corp., 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 473, 502-04 (1987) [hereinafter Citicorp/J.P. Morgan/Bankers Trust], aff'd sub nom. Securities
Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter
Citicorp], (approving underwriting and dealing in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed secu-
rities, and commercial paper), J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc., Chase Manhattan Corp., Bankers Trust New
York Corp., Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989) [hereinafter Limited
Bank Underwriting Decision] (permitting banks through affiliates to engage in limited underwriting
of corporate debt and equity securities), Bankers Trust New York Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 829
(1989) [hereinafter Bankers Trust New York] (approving bank affiliate to act as an agent in the
private placement of all types of securities as well as to act as a riskless principal in buying and
selling securities).
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how the new amendments to the securities acts 7 set the stage for SEC jurisdiction
over comprehensive banking activities. It is direct involvement by the SEC that
will be the linchpin for comprehensive banking's success. Part III examines why
comprehensive banking is right for the current economic climate and how the
SEC and the Board must work together to comprehensively regulate private equity
and debt underwriting activities of commercial banks. Part IV seeks to gauge the
impact on the securities markets and the banking industry, with a special sensitivity
toward the historical reasons for separating commercial and investment banking.
It is apparent that this separation is not as necessary as Senator Glass perceived, 8
and that the current sophistication of the nation's and world's financial markets
permits comprehensive banking in the United States. In conclusion, this note
comments on Congress' willingness to act promptly and anticipate the response
of the financial and legal worlds in the wake of comprehensive banking legislation
of any degree.
I. HISTORY OF MODERN BANKING LAW
The climate that set the stage for today's banking and securities laws was
the Great Depression. Because of unregulated speculation by banks with depos-
itors' money, many of the nation's leading banks either collapsed or had to shut
their doors to their own depositors.' 9 The resulting panic, and later depression,
17. The Federal securities law comprises mainly the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1988) [hereinafter
the '33 Act] and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-11 (1988) [hereinafter
the '34 Act]. The primary purpose of the '33 Act is to regulate distributions of securities by protecting
the investor through special disclosure and antifraud requirements. The primary purpose of the '34
Act is to regulate trading of securities on the nation's exchanges, as well as apply special registration
requirements. T. HAzEN, THE LAW OF SEcurrmEs REoULATION (2d ed. 1990).
18. The Second Circuit noted Senator Glass' concern for the separation of commercial and
investment banking in Citicorp: Senator Glass remarked: " I want to make it impossible hereafter
to have the portfolios of commercial banks filled with useless speculative securities, so that when
stringency comes upon the country these banks may not respond to the requirements of commerce."
839 F.2d at 59.
19. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 629-30, wherein the Court exposited in great detail Congress' rationale
for enacting the Glass-Steagall Act:
The failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930 was widely attributed to that
bank's activities with respect to its numerous securities affiliates. Moreover, Congress
was concerned that commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal
Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged by stock market
decline partly because of their direct and indirect involvement in the trading and
ownership of speculative securities. The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination
that policies of competition, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise support
the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business were outweighed
by the 'hazards' and 'financial dangers' that arise when commercial banks engage in
the activities proscribed by the Act.
Id.
See also Part IV of the Camp opinion, 401 U.S. at 629, for a complete summary, in the Court's
view, of why Congress enacted the Act. Some commentators, however, believe that the Act was not
precipitated by the financial woes of the Great Depression, but because of a desire to protect big
business securities firms from losing too much business to an inevitably large banking industry.
Kaufman and Mote, Glass-Steagall: Repeal by Regulatory and Judicial Reinterpretation, 107 BANKING
L.J. 388, 393-94 (1990). See also G.J. BENsrON, THE SEPARATION OF COMERCIAL AN INvEsTMENT
BANKING: THE GLAss-STEAOALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990) and White, Before the
Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment Banking Activities of National Banks, 23 Explo-
rations in Econ. Hist., 33-55 (1986) (offering evidence that the failure of securities affiliates did not
cause the collapse of a single bank).
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led Congress to pass tough regulatory laws with the simple goal of never having
such a disaster again3 ° Ultimately, these laws were designed to separate one
industry fraught with risk and devoid of public confidence, with another industry,
the banking industry, which should be the backbone of the American economic
system and which the public should never doubt. The Court, in Camp, delineated
Congress' intent to ensure a stable and permanent banking system:
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment banking business
... because ... the promotional incentives of investment banking and the
investment banker's pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment
opportunities was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking
and of public confidence in the commercial banking system.2'
The Camp majority also recognized several "subtle hazards" as well as the
obvious hazard of a bank using depositor money to make "imprudent stock or
security investments."" The hazards the Court outlined are part of the bank-
affiliate relationship where the bank begins to act as a player in the market
instead of just a "fiduciary or managing agent."3 The subtle hazards Congress
was concerned with involved "promotional and other pressures on the bank"
which could irhpair public confidence in the bank,2' losses investors might suffer
from relying on a bank affiliate's involvement with a issue of securities, improper
lending to a corporate client where the bank affiliate has become too deeply
involved, bank loans to preferred customers for the purpose of purchasing
securities, and conflicts of interest between the "promotional interest of the
investment banker and the obligation of the commercial banker to render disin-
terested investment advice.' '25 Thus, these primary concerns and subtle hazards
motivated Congress to erect the "Glass-Steagall wall" between investment and
commercial banking. They continue to permeate Congress while the courts and
the Board have recognized the banking industry's evolution.26
A. The Glass-Steagall Act: Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32
The Glass-Steagall Act is a conglomeration of sections throughout the
Banking Act of 193327 designed to separate commercial and investment banking.
Section 16n delineates the basic powers of the national banks and their limited
involvement in the securities business. 29 It seeks to keep commercial banking
20. Camp, 401 U.S. at 629-30. See also Smith, Glass-Steagall Act-A History of Its Legislative
Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKNG L.J. 38 (1975) (discussing the legislative history
and initial regulatory construction the Board and Comptroller of the Currency gave to the Act).
21. Camp, 401 U.S. at 634.
22. Id. at 630.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 630-31.
25. Id. at 633.
26. The Board has liberalized its view of the Glass-Steagall restrictions on commercial banks
underwriting securities and the courts have generally afforded the Board great deference in their
decisions. See e.g. Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 68 (1981) and Camp,
401 U.S. at 626-27 (giving deference to the Comptroller of the Currency's decision since he has the
duty to enforce the banking laws).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 21-531 (1988).
28. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
29. The relevant text of section 16 reads as follows:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to
1991]
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separate from investment banking by limiting commercial banking powers to
traditional bank business, such as dealing in promissory notes and other types
of debt instruments, as well as a limited purchasing role for the "account" of
its customers.30 In addition to this limited role, national banks also have the
power to deal in municipal securities." This power includes not only purchasing
for the account of the bank's customer, but also involves general underwriting
and other activities that are otherwise precluded by the Act with regards to equity
and debt securities because they carry an attendant riskier investment. 2 The
exception to the general prohibition of underwriting and dealing in securities is
accompanied by other significant exceptions; exceptions which many commenta-
tors argue requires Congress to abandon the Act, or at the very least, to overhaul
it.3 The general prohibitions, however, still remain in force, albeit somewhat
eroded, and continue to impede the evolution of commercial banking.
To deal with institutions that are active in the securities markets, section 21
prohibits those persons who participate in the securities business from under-
writing, dealing or selling "to engage at the same time to any extent whatever
in the business of receiving deposits subject to check or repayment upon pres-
entation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon
request of the depositor .... "4 This prohibition closes both ends of the spectrum
of commercial and investment banking. Consequently, institutions that are either
national banks, as perceived by section 16, or securities firms, as perceived by
section 21, may not engage in the business of the other, subject to a number of
exceptions.35 The primary wall between commercial banking and investment
banking is thus compromised of these two sections.
Both sections 16 and 21 on their face exclude certain "investment securities,"
subject to approval of the Comptroller of the Currency ("Comptroller"). 6 This
leaves open the ability of banks to deal in these investment securities for their
own account. The availability of investment securities, however, is limited by the
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order,
and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the
association shall not underwrite any issue of stock: Provided, [t]hat the association may
purchase for its own account investment securities under such limitations and restrictions
as the Comptroller of the Currency may by regulation prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988) (emphasis in original). While the definitions of various terms in the
Glass-Steagall Act have come under considerable debate, such as "security," "issuer," and "under-
write," the securities acts have been relied on to help define these terms in their relevant contexts.
See, e.g., Camp, 401 U.S. at 635-36, where the Court defines "security" for purposes of the Glass-
Steagall Act to encompass a wide variety of investment instruments to protect against inventive
bankers seeking to sidestep the Act's prohibitions.
30. 12 U.S.c. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
31. Id. Within the context of Section 16, "selling a security" on the order of customers, and
without recourse to the bank means that upon the specific order of the customer, the bank may act
as the customer's agent and purchase securities for that customer. M. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE
CAPITAL MARKET AcTrVIms Op BANKS AND BANK HoLDNo COMPANEs 6 (1990).
32. "The limitations and restrictions herein ... shall not apply to obligations of the United
States, or general obligations of any [s]tate or of any political subdivision thereof .... 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (Seventh) (1988).
33. Kaufman and Mote, supra note 19, at 418.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 378(aX1) (1988) (emphasis added).
35. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
36. H. BLOomENTHAL, SEcurrms LAW HANDBOOK § 1.07, at 9 (1900-91 ed.).
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Comptroller to "marketable debt securities" bearing a low level of risk and,
thereby, a lower return vis-a-vis higher risk instruments.7 Furthermore, as pro-
vided for on the face of the statute, commercial banks are allowed to underwrite
municipal securities in the form of general obligations of the United States and
the states or any political subdivision." This ability to underwrite government
bonds, and other securities backed by the goodwill of the government, has given
commercial banks relatively good experience in underwriting financial instruments,
albeit instruments with a low level of risk. The underlying rationale for allowing
commercial banks to underwrite these government securities is the fact that they
are backed by the goodwill of the government.
Section 209 of the Act "precludes an affiliate of a bank from being 'engaged
principally' in the securities activities prohibited to a bank under section 214.0°
This section covers "issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale or distribution,
at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities .. .. ,,4 Congress intended this section to
apply to any affiliate of a bank to ensure a complete divorce of commercial and
investment banking. Although the Board has recently approved some bank holding
companies' applications to underwrite securities that banks, in their own capacity,
were precluded from underwriting, the Board has insisted on keeping the parent
bank holding companies and their subsidiaries under the same rules. 42 Thus, the
impenetrable wall has weakened. Further action by Congress to open the doors
to allow a closer relationship by banks and their subsidiaries engaged in the
securities underwriting business is warranted. The ability for national commercial
banks with robust financial health to expand their capital generating bases into
the securities industry under the jurisdiction of the SEC, through well protected
subsidiaries, separated from the funds of the parent bank, is necessary for
American banks to continue to grow and diversify and reclaim a stake in modern
investment markets.
37. Id. The Comptroller has developed three categories of investment securities pursuant to his
rule making authority. 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(c)-(e) (1990). The regulations divide the types of securities
activities into three categories. "Type I securit[ies]" are those "a bank may deal in, underwrite,
purchase and sell for its own account without limitation." 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(c). These generally include
government securities as outlined in section 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988). "Type II securitlies]"
refer to securities a bank may market in similar fashion as with "Type I" securities, "subject to a
10-percent limitation." 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(d). These include specialized securities, such as those of the
Tennessee Valley Authority or securities issued by a state or political subdivision. "Type Ill
securitlies]" are those "which a bank may purchase and sell for its own account, subject to a 10-
percent limitation, but may neither deal in not underwrite." BoomENThAL, supra note 36, § 1.07,
at 9.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
40. H. BLoowrssL, supra note 36, at 9 (emphasis added).
41. M. CAPATIDEs, supra note 31, at 7, (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988)).
42. Id. Some commentators have argued that the Board's interpretation of "engaged principally"
has weakened the Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and investment banking through the parent/
subsidiary relationship. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. Additionally, while some
activities by the subsidiary fall under the securities laws, the scope of the securities laws is limited
somewhat as compared to a nonbank performing the same function. For instance, section 3(a)(2) of
the '33 Act exempt securities "issued or guaranteed" by banks from registration. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)
(1988). See also T. HAzEN, supra note 17, § 4.3, at 129. Moreover, section 12(i) permits publically
held banks to file disclosure and other information documents, that are similar to those required by
the SEC, with bank regulators instead of with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1988).
1991]
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The last relevant section of the Act is section 32.43 This section, similar in
purpose and design to section 20,44 prohibits 'interlocking' directors, officers,
or employees between any organization engaged in underwriting securities and a
member bank of the Federal Reserve System 5.4  Notwithstanding that this section
was an additional attempt to close the door on the union between commercial
and investment banking, the Board has discretion to allow sharing of directors
if "it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member bank[s]
or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.""6 This power gives
the Board the responsibility to remove the prohibition on those entities which
establish a degree of separateness in their activities, and which would not leave
any indicia of unfair investment practices.47
B. Securities Activities Allowed by Banks and Bank Holding Companies
The ability of banks to engage in securities activities is very much a part of
modem banking practice." The Act has explicit terms prohibiting investment
banking by commercial banks. It addresses bank underwriting of securities, bank
purchase of securities for its customers, and bank purchase of securities for its
own account.4 9 The creativity of commercial banks to find loopholes in the law
and the willingness of the Board and Comptroller to go along with such activities,
however, has left many types of securities transactions open to commercial
banks.5 0 The primary proscription that still remains, however, involves under-
writing by commercial banks of publically issued corporate debt and equity
securities. 5 This bastion is the last real restriction that has not been substantially
diminished.
The Act does not, however, exclude all capital market activities which may
involve a commercial bank performing as an underwriter, 2 as evidence by the
Act's permissibility of bank underwriting of government securities.53 This category
43. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
44. The Court noted in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
468 U.S. 207, 219 (1983), a case under section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
that section 20 and 32 "contain identical language, were enacted for similar purposes, and are part
of the same statute, .... " Id.
45. M. CAPATiDES, supra note 31, at 7-8.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
47. See Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 445-49 (1947) (partnership held primarily
engaged in underwriting and dealing securities within the meaning of section 32 of the Act and
therefore, its employees were prohibited from serving on the board of directors of a member bank
of the Federal Reserve System).
48. As a general matter, securities practice includes underwriting and dealing or brokeraging
corporate and government securities and advisory services on investment strategies for the institutional
or individual investor. Banks are allowed to engage in most securities activities, except underwriting
and dealing because of the prohibitions in Glass-Steagall.
49. V. DUMoRENzo, W. ScHuIcHrrNG, & J. COOPER 5 BANKn G LAw Banks and Securities Laws
§ 96.02(2) (1987) [hereinafter V. DELORENZO & J. COOPER].
50. Id § 96.02(3), at 96-26.1.
51. Some commentators believe that this prohibition remains only regarding firm commitment
underwriter which involves the actual purchase by the underwriting of the security in issue, and then
reselling such security. M. CAATIDES, supra note 31, at 20.
52. This availability, however, is subject to the "exercise of prudent banking judgment," which
requires the bank to examine a particular obligor's credit and ability to make all required payments
connected with the obligation. M. CAPATIDES, supra note 31, at 21, n.39.
53. This category of government securities also includes "general obligation municipal bonds,
agency-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, and certain kinds of municipal revenue bonds."
TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-15.
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of "unlimited" '54 underwriting has expanded into many creative financial instru-
ments." Banks may also underwrite some nongovernment instruments, such as
mortgage pass-through certificates, since such activity is deemed "within the
'business of banking' under [section 16], and therefore ... not prohibited by
the Act.56
In addition to the ability of banks to engage in the underwriting of general
government obligations and other special instruments which fall within the
business of banking, commercial banks may purchase and sell instruments which
are within the "traditional" practice of banks. This power, granted by the Act
in section 16, and formally recognized by the Court in Securities Indus. Ass'n
v. Board of Governor,"1 allows banks to purchase and sell such instruments as
certificates of deposit, bank investment contracts, brokered deposits, banker's
acceptances, commercial paper backed by a letter of credit, loan sales, and
repurchase agreements.5" These instruments are the capital market activities which
banks have a special interest in dealing in because they involve a bank's traditional
function of dealing in business inextricably linked with the business of banking;
which is taking care of a depositor's money and generating capital for the bank's
own use. In addition, these practices delineate the wall between the activities
traditionally handled by the banking industry and those activities where securities
firms have a special expertise.59
54. M. CAPATIDES, supra note 31, at 20-1.
55. Id. at 366-73. Capatides diagrams the myriad of securities and other financial instruments
which comprise the allowable capital market activities of banks. While many of these instruments
are useful to the practitioner, they involve extremely specialized analysis of the requirements, which
has been omitted here.
56. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1052 (2d Cir. 1989). Mortgage pass-through
certificates are interests in a pool of mortgage loans which the bank has pooled and which is under
the control of a trust. The certificates represent a "fractional undivided interest in the pool of
mortgage loans[,j [and] ... may then be sold publicly or privately." Id. at 1036. The court concluded
that the "threshold question [is] whether [an] activity . . .constitutes 'the business of banking' or,
instead, the 'business of dealing in securities and stock."' Id. at 1048 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh) (1988)). Consequently, underwriting only becomes an issue if a bank activity constitutes
the business dealing in securities. If not, then Glass-Steagall prohibitions do not apply. Id.
57. 468 U.S. 137 (1984) [hereinafter Becker]. See also M. CAPATmEs, supra note 31, at 37 (citing
Becker which "recognized a distinction for Glass-Steagall purposes between financial instruments
traditionally handled by the banking industry and those traditionally handled by the securities
industry." Id.). See Becker, 468 U.S. at 149-154.
58. M. CAPArimEs, supra note 31, at 36-80. Certificates of deposit, deemed not a security by
the Court in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) are well within the power of a commercial
bank's capital activity. Bank investment contracts are agreements between the bank and an investor
"whereby the investor deposits funds with the bank and the bank agrees to repay those funds at a
specified rate of interest on a specified date or over a period of time." Id. at 46. These investment
contracts have been traditionally used by banks and are considered a traditional banking activity
under the Act. Brokered deposits are deposits "received from a third party-who is not the beneficial
owner of the deposit-that pay an interest rate typically in excess of retail CD [sic] rates in the relevant
market." Id. at 51. Bankers' acceptances are a "signed promise by the drawee of a draft that the
draft will be honored at its maturity." Id. at 56. Drafts are writings that operate similarly to checks,
and are used by investors to "facilitate the acquisition of goods" based on the credit of the bank.
Id. Commercial paper, backed by a letter of credit, while deemed a security for section 16, is not
precluded from being underwritten, as long as its is backed by a letter of credit. Id. at 60. "A
repurchase agreement ... is an agreement between two parties to exchange securities, for cash and/
or securities for a specified period of time." Id. at 73. These repurchase agreements usually involve
government backed obligations and thus fall under one of the traditional activities allowed by section
16 of the Act.
59. M. CAPATMES, supra note 31, at 37.
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These activities represent a somewhat diversified practice by banks in light
of the restrictions of the Act. The courts have, for the most part, approved these
activities under challenge by the Securities Industry Association ("SIA") which
attempts to have the courts strictly apply the Act.60 Two recent cases, that
evidence the crumbling of the Glass-Steagall wall between investment and com-
mercial banking, have supported the Board's approval of expanded securities
activities by highly capitalized commercial banks.6 ' In Citicorp,62 the Second
Circuit paved the way for bank holding company affiliates63 to underwrite and
deal in limited securities activities.64 While the affiliates of the holding companies
were engaged in underwriting and dealing in U.S. government, agency, and state
securities, they additionally sought underwriting in "municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage related securities, consumer receivables related securities, and commer-
cial paper." ' 6- The case focused on the issue of what is a security for purposes
of the Act and what does "engaged principally" mean under section 20 of the
Act.
The court first determined that Congress was primarily concerned with bank
affiliates underwriting "bank-ineligible" securities. This concern comprises in-
vestment securities which are highly speculative in nature and not securities of
"undoubted character," such as securities of the United States and the states. 67
Thus, as the court continued, the use of "securities" in section 20 refers only to
bank-ineligible securities." Consequently, the activities which the Board had earlier
approved were upheld by the court, which explained that "[b]ecause underwriting
and dealing in government securities pose no hazards to banks themselves, a
foritori bank affiliates should be able principally to engage in the same activity." 69
The other primary issue the court determined in Citicorp focused on the
meaning of "engaged principally" in section 20.70 While the banks argued a
60. See Camp, 401 U.S. 617, ICI, 450 U.S. 46, Becker, 468 U.S. 137 (1984), Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), Citicorp, 839 F.2d 47, Clarke, 885
F.2d 1034, and Securities Indus, Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 360 (1990) (hereinafter
Bankers Trust].
61. Both cases deal with the activity of an affiliate under the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956. It is under section 4(c)(8) of this Act that banks acquire an affiliate relationship with firms
which engage in some underwriting activities but are, for the purposes of the Bank Holding Company
Act and the Board a company "the activities of which ... [are] so closely related to banking ...
as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988). Since the Board has the discretion
to determine whether an activity is "so closely related to banking" under the Glass-Steagall Act,
"the principal issue before the Board was whether the approval of the activities would contravene
that Act." Citicorp. 839 F.2d at 50.
62. 839 F.2d 47 (2d. Cir. 1988).
63. The Companies involved were Bankers Trust New York Corp., J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.,
Citicorp, The Chase Manhattan Corp., Manufacturers Hanover Corp., Chemical New York Corp.,
and Security Pacific Corp.
64. Congress was not necessarily worried about commercial banks having such affiliates. Instead,
the main concern was with "entry of commercial banks into the investment banking field either
directly or indirectly." Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 62.
65. Id. at 50.
66. Id. at 60.
67. Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933)).
68. Id. at 61.
69. Id. at 62, (emphasis in original). "[I]t was not Congress' purpose in (section] 20 to preclude
a bank affiliate from engaging in the same activities to the same extent as a member bank and we
uphold the Board's determination that the reference in [section] 20 to 'securities' does not encompass
those securities which [section] 16 allows banks themselves to underwrite." Id.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
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different approach to the determination of "engaged principally" than the Board,
the court found that Congress intended that phrase to mean substantially engaged
in the business of underwriting securities. Therefore, it deferred to the Board's
five to ten percent gross revenue limit for an affiliate's securities activities. 7'
In a companion case, the D.C. Circuit considered an order by the Board to
allow bank affiliates to underwrite and deal in corporate debt and equity
securities. 72 While the SIA attempted to argue the definition of "security" and
"principally engaged" as in Citicorp, the court in Bankers Trust precluded those
issues under the doctrine of res judicata .7 Thus the court focused on the language
of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to determine if
underwriting corporate debt and securities could amount to an activity "closely
related to banking" and, therefore, be permissible by a bank affiliate.7 4
When examining whether an activity is closely related to banking, the Board
will have the power to decide "how closely related a particular activity must be
to meet the closely related test, subject only to judicial review."" s In Bankers
Trust, the court examined the development of commercial banking, noting the
experience that banks have received in such activities as "private placement of
debt and equity securities, the syndication of loans, the purchase and sale of
securities as a fiduciary for others, [and] the underwriting and dealing in bank-
eligible government securities . *... ,76 Moreover, the court explained that the
relationship between commercial and investment banking is not as different as
the Act mandates. Congress well understood the idea that bank underwriting
securities is closely related to commercial banking, "[o]therwise, [Congress] would
not have expressly permitted, in [s]ection 20 of the Act, bank affiliates to engage
in even a limited amount of securities dealing.""
By approving the Board's determination, the court was left to decide if the
benefits to the public were outweighed by the adverse effects of having a bank
affiliate underwrite and deal in corporate debt and equity securities. The court
addressed SIA's arguments concluding that the concerns normally attendant to a
commercial bank engaging in this type of underwriting activity are not as
threatening in the case of an affiliate. Consequently, the court upheld the Board's
approval. First, the court explained that "bank affiliates must maintain a capital
71. Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 63. The board employed a qualitative and quantitative construction of
the term and stated that "an affiliate would not be principally or substantially engaged in bank-
ineligible activities if: (1) the gross revenue from [Section] 20 activities did not exceed five to ten
percent of the affiliate's total gross revenue. . . ." Id. at 63. The Board also employed a "market
share" test for determining the level of activity by the affiliate, but the court rejected that aspect of
the Board's test. Id. at 67-8.
72. 900 F.2d 360 (1990).
73. Bankers Trust, 900 F.2d at 363-64.
74. Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 requires the Board to engage in
a two part inquiry to determine if the proposed activity is allowable by the affiliate and therefore
within the exemption. First, the Board must determine if the activity is closely related to banking.
Second, the board must examine if the activity would produce "benefits to the public that would
outweigh possible adverse effects." Bankers Trust, 900 F.2d at 365.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 366. The Court continued that "banks must, to survive, develop sophistication in the
... capacity to structure new security issues, and the expertise to buy and sell securities in a secondary
market." Id.
77. Id.
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ratio significantly higher than that which the SEC requires for security firms." 8
This fiscal cushion will help protect against the losses of the affiliate and prevent
those losses from subtracting from the holdings of the parent bank. Second, to
address Glass-Steagall concerns for conflicts of interest between the bank and
the affiliates' customers thereby jeopardizing the bank's goodwill image, the court
approved the Board's requirement of extensive "firewalls ' 79 to separate the parent
bank and its affiliates.8 In addition to the protective measures the Board required
for an affiliate to enter into the corporate debt/equity securities market, the
court noted that the added "competition in the underwriting markets [would]
promote greater convenience and efficiency for customers, and improve the ability
of United States banks to compete effectively in world markets.''81 Consequently,
the court approved the participation of these bank affiliates in "bank-ineligible"
securities activities.
Additionally, the courts have embraced the Board's widdling away of the
Glass-Steagall barrier between commercial and investment banking more recently
because of greater deference to the Board's interpretation of the prohibitions
under Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act.8 2 In two key releases
recently, the Board approved broad securities activities by bank holding company
subsidiaries under section 4(c)(8) 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act." The
Board's approval contains numerous restrictions, such as special firewalls to
78. Id.
79. The firewalls are designed to limit the risk to the parent bank, limit the type of subsidiary
to a nonbank affiliate, and "prevent conflicts of interest" and other abuses. TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 2, at XVIII-16.
80. Id. The court explained its concerns in the following manner noting the extensive protection
the Board instituted to ensure the bank's stability:
As for the classic Glass-Steagall-related worries that banks will be drawn into a conflict
of interest in the allocation of credit to customers of their securities affiliates or that
prospective losses by the affiliates would jeopardize the bank's reputations, the Board
insisted on a comprehensive series of 'firewalls' to insulate the affiliates from the banks.
The banks are not permitted to extend credit nor purchase from or sell assets to the
affiliates. Nor are the banks permitted to extend credit to customers of the affiliates if
that might be viewed as enhancing marketability or creditworthiness of an issue under-
written or distributed by the affiliate. The Board also prohibits the bank from extending
credit to purchase any such securities or pay the principal, interest, or dividends on
these securities, and the bank may not participate in the marketing of any securities
issue distributed by the affiliate.
Id. This type of firewall demonstrates the extended activity bank affiliates may engage in, and the
type of regulatory structure that Congress should implement to deal with broader capital market
activities by banks, especially in underwriting and dealing in securities.
81. Id. at 367.
82. See Citicorp, 839 F.2d at 52 (quoting Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F. 2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 207: 'Because the Board has
both primary responsibility for implementing the Glass-Steagall Act and expert knowledge of com-
mercial banking, we must uphold its interpretation of the Act if it is reasonable."') and Camp, 401
U.S. at 626 where the Court explains that "we cannot come lightly to the conclusion that the
Comptroller has authorized activity that violates the banking laws. It is settled that courts should
give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency
charged with the enforcement of that statute." Id.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988).
84. See Bankers Trust New York, supra note 16, at 829 (allowing subsidiary "to act as an agent
in the private placement of all types of securities, including providing related advisory services, and
to buy and sell all types of securities on the order of investors as a 'riskless principal."') and Limited
Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 16 (allowing to a limited extent subsidiaries to underwrite
and deal in certain securities).
guard the parent banks from the risk of expanded securities activities by a
subsidiary, and special percentage caps on the amount of securities activities of
an affiliate."5 Notwithstanding these restrictions, the Board has provided a clear
signal that the limitations of the Act present barriers which should be either
substantially adjusted or removed to allow more diverse securities activities by
banks. By following this lead set by the courts in Citicorp and Bankers Trust,
and the Board in Bankers Trust New York and Limited Bank Underwriting
Decision, Congress can enact a comprehensive banking reform law that would
allow banks and their affiliates to engage in the activities already permitted, to
a limited extent, by the affiliates.
8 6
II. The Securities Laws and SERA
The securities laws8 7 are designed to promote disclosure to the individual
investor of all relevant information about a company's issue of securities on the
market. This allows the investor to make an informed decision about purchasing
a security. The securities laws are also designed to provide extensive, anti-fraud
protection for the investor who purchases issued stock. This protection allows a
defrauded investor to seek recission against the underwriters, the dealers, and
the accountants. While these laws have had a considerable impact on the securities
industry, their enforcement has created one of the strongest federal governmental
agencies, the Securities Exchange Commission. The SEC has jurisdiction over
both the registration process of securities offered for sale, and enforcement of
the antifraud provisions of the '33 Act and '34 Act. 8 While these laws provide
ample protection for securities firms and investors, banks are exempted and thus
are not responsible to the SEC for their securities activities.
A. Exemption for Banks: The '33 Act
The key exemption from registration for banks provided by the '33 Act is
contained in section 3(a)(2).89 This section excludes from the registration require-
ment "any security issued or guaranteed by any bank; or any security issued by
or representing an interest in or a direct obligation of a Federal Reserve Bank.'"'9
This exemption remains today because it is still believed that the bank regulatory
apparatus and other regulatory agencies are able to compensate for a lack of
85. Bankers Trust New York, supra note 16, at 835.
86. See Markey, Why Congress Must Amend Glass-Steagall: Recent Trends in Breaching the
Wall Separating Commercial and Investment Banking,25 NEw ENG. L. REv.457 (1991) in which
Markey explains that approval of bank underwriting of private placements, selling of mutual funds,
providing discount brokerage activities and full service brokerage and advisory services, distributing
asset-backed securities, and activities of affiliates which do not amount to principal distribution point
to a new understanding by the Board and the courts that investment and commercial banking are
becoming inextricably intertwined. Id. 465-74.
87. See supra note 16.
88. The registration statement contains information regarding the issuer's business and property,
the securities offered and their relationship to the issuer's "other securities," the management of the
issuer, and certain financial statements regarding the financial health of the company. V. DILORENZO
& J. COOPER, supra note 49, § 99.02, at 99-4. The registration statement also contains a description
of the riskiness of the offering in regards of future market projection. This is usually included to
protect the issuer from future liability if the issue fails.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(aX2) (1988).
90. Id.
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coverage by the securities laws. The '34 Act attempts to remedy this exemption
by coverage under sections 13 and 15(d) for companies who have securities traded
on a national exchange, which have been subject to registration under the '33
Act or where 500 or more persons hold a class of equity securities and the issuer
has more than five million in assets. 9' Under the '33 Act, however, banks may
fit into the section 3(a)(2) exemption and avoid coverage of the registration and
antifraud provisions applicable to other issuers who fall under the '33 Act.
The '33 Act exemption raises two main issues: what constitutes a "bank"
and what does "issued or guaranteed" by any bank encompass. 92 The definition
of "bank" referred to in the '33 Act includes any "national bank or any banking
institution organized under the laws of any state, . . . the business of which is
substantially confined to banking and which is supervised by the [sitate or ...
similar [banking] official . . . . '9 The two requirements-that the bank be under
the regulatory authority of a state banking commission and the business of the
company be "substantially confined to banking"-must both be met for the
bank to fit the exemption under the '33 Act.
In dealing with the second problem area under Section 3(a)(2) of "issued or
guaranteed by any bank," 94 the SEC takes the position that guaranteed should
be "liberally construed" and should apply to instances where the bank "agrees
to see to the payment of a security." 9 The normal situation envisioned here
involves a bank backing notes or bonds and to pay them at maturity if not
honored by the issuer. The term guarantee can be applied to underwriting or
other types of guarantees by banks which make them responsible for placing a
financial instrument on the market." This type of scheme would fall under Glass-
Steagall restrictions, such as section 16, but the SEC would be without jurisdiction
to enforce its registration requirements against the bank because of the section
3(a)(2) exemption.9
B. '34 Act: SEC Coverage of Banks and Their Affiliates
The '34 Act, the second of the federal securities laws, is also designed to
have information passed on to an investor about a company which is offering
securities for sale. Two threshold requirements trigger coverage by the '34 Act:
either the security is traded on a national exchange, or the company's assets
exceed five million dollars and the shareholders of the company number 500 or
more.9 The registration requirements under the '34 Act, unlike the '33 Act, are
triggered only if a company fits either of the two '34 Act requirements and is
thus a '34 Act company. 99
91. T. HAZEN, supra note 17, at 70, n.30. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1988) and 17
C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1990).
92. V. DILORENZO & J. COOPER, supra note 49, § 99.03, at 99-8.
93. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988)).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1988).
95. V. DILORENZO & J. COOPER, supra note 49, § 99.03 at 99-9.
96. Id.
97. Chairman Breeden has remarked that any revision of the Act to allow banks wider securities
activities should be accompanied by repealing of sections 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(5) which exempt securities
issued by banks from the registration requirements of the '33 Act. Stalemate in Reform, supra note
1, at S-3.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1988).
99. V. DILORENZO & J. COOPER, supra note 49, § 100.02, at 100-4.
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The key exemption under the '34 Act for banks is their absence from the
definition of broker or dealer.'00 The term "broker" is any person, other than a
bank, whose business involves buying and selling any security for the benefit of
others.10' Dealer encompasses any person who buys securities for his or her own
account, excluding banks."'2 These two terms have been interpreted to refer to
those professionals who are regularly involved in the securities business, excluding
banks and individuals. 03 Banks are excluded because of their regulation under
Glass-Steagall.
C. SERA and the new "in house" power of the SEC
To give the SEC more authority to enforce federal securities laws, Congress
passed SERA in 1990.104 This legislation amends the securities laws to provide
the SEC more "in house" administrative enforcement power to "maintain investor
confidence in the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of [the] securities markets."' 0
Both the broader civil fining power and the new cease and desist power, which
allow the SEC to stop a violative selling activity quickly and efficiently, protect
potential investors as soon as possible. Furthermore, the ability to bar certain
persons from positions on the board of directors of a company who are "unfit"
to serve in such capacities will help the SEC prospectively protect investors from
imprudent directors and officers who can easily engage in violative financial
activity due to their position in the company."' 6 These functions not only serve
100. Id. § 100.03, at 100-6. Section 15(a)(1) requires that securities brokers and dealers be
registered unless they fit into an appropriate exemption under the act. T. HAZEN, supra note 17,
§ 10.2.2, at 396.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1988). The statute states: "The term 'broker' means any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not
include a bank." Id.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1988). Here, the '34 Act outlines a fairly narrow definition of dealer:
"The term 'dealer' means any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his
own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person insofar as
he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but
not as a part of a regular business." Id.
103. T. HAZEN, supra note 17, at 397. The law covering the "engaged in the business of"
language is more complex and requires an analysis the person's activities and the securities business
and what his role in that business involves. Id. (citing, e.g., Lipton, A Primer on Broker-Dealer
Registration, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 899, 910 (1987).
104. See supra note 7.
105. H.R. Rep. No. 101-616, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMaN
NEws 1379, 1381 [hereinafter LEG. HISTORY]. Generally, the legislation amends the securities laws to
do the following:
[(1)] authorize the federal courts to order the payment of civil money penalties, in
addition to disgorgement, for a broad range of violations of federal securities laws;
[(2)] authorize the Commission to order disgorgement and impose civil money penalties
in certain administrative proceedings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act), the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act), and the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 (Investment Advisors Act); [(3)] authorize the Com-
mission to issue cease-and-desits orders for violations of the securities laws; and [(4)]
expressly affirm the inherent authority of a federal district court, in connection with
injunctive actions brought by the Commission, to issue orders that prohibit an individual
from serving as an officer or director of any reporting company if the individual has
violated Section 17(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) or Section 10b
of the Exchange Act or the rules thereunder and the individual's conduct demonstrates
substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director.
Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (1990).
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the securities industry, but also pave the way for greater control by the SEC
over the entire financial market, especially one where banks play a larger and
more competitive role.
Specifically, SERA is divided according to its amendments of the securities
laws. Under the amendments to the '33 Act, the SEC may seek three tiers of
penalties in a district court for any violation of the '33 Act.1° The SEC can ask
the court to prohibit any person whose conduct "demonstrates substantial unfit-
ness" from serving as an officer or director of a '34 Act reporting company1 ° 8
SERA also gives the SEC power to require any person who may violate the
securities laws or any regulations thereof to cease and desist from such activity.1°9
This authority allows the SEC greater ability to head off future violations and
require violating companies to comply with the securities laws or face severe civil
and other penalties. The power to cease and desist also gives the SEC greater
control over how companies comply with the securities laws. The ability to stop
all activity with regarding a certain security because of possible violations gives
the SEC greater flexibility to protect the investor before harmful action takes
place.
The amendments to the '34 Act make similar changes as noted for the '33
Act with the addition of a provision for civil remedies in administrative proceed-
ings. Under section 21B of the '34 Act, as amended, the SEC or "appropriate
regulatory agency" may impose a civil penalty against any person who has
willfully violated, aided or abetted a violation, who has caused a report required
to be filed pursuant to the securities laws to be false or misleading, or who has
failed to "supervise" to prevent such violation."10 SERA also provides a tiered
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(l), (2) (1990).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (1990).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l (1990). The authority of the SEC to issue a cease and desist order is
explained in the following manner:
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any person is
violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this title, or any rule or
regulation thereunder, the Commission may publish its findings and enter an order
requiring such person, and any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of the
violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would
contribute to such violation, to cease and desist from committing or causing such
violation and any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation. Such order
may, . . . require such person to comply, or take steps to effect compliance, ... upon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the Commission may specify in such
order.
Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1990). The amendments here to the '34 Act give the SEC the power to
prospectively protect investors from violations and use the administrative process to attack willful
violators without going into district court. Section 21B contains the following language:
mhe Commission or the appropriate regulatory agency may impose a civil penalty if
it finds, . . . after notice and opportunity to be heard that such person-
(1) has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment
Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, or this title [the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934], or the rules or regulations thereunder .... ;
(2) has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured such a
violation by any other person;
(3) has willfully made or caused to be made in any application for registration or
report required to be filed with the Commission or with any other appropriate regulatory
agency under this title, or in any proceeding before the Commission with respect to
registration, any statement which was, at the time and in light of the circumstances
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fining system for violations of the '34 Act."' Additionally, whether a penalty
serves the public interest, as the last part of section 21B(a) requires, is covered
by section 21B(c). Here, when assessing to impose a penalty, the SEC "or the
appropriate regulatory agency may consider" six different criteria: "(1) whether
the act or omission for which such penalty is assessed involved fraud, deceit,
manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement;"
(2) direct or indirect harm to other persons because of such act or omission;
"(3) the extent to which any person was unjustly enriched, taking into account
any restitution made to persons injured by such behavior," (4) whether the SEC
or another regulatory agency has previously found such person to have violated
federal or state securities laws or regulatory rules; (5) the need to deter such
person and other persons from committing such acts or omissions in the future;
and (6) any other matters "as justice may require.""t2
Supplementary to its extensive fining power, the SEC also has new cease
and desist authority under the '34 Act, as amended.' This power can be exercised
either temporarily or permanently to stop violative financial activity at its source
and to apply uniform regulations.' '4 Thus, the SEC has the ability to deal with
creative capital market activities which go beyond prudent investment practices.
By extending the regulatory arm to persons associated with those involved in
"misconduct," the SEC can effectively apply the securities laws early in the
process through efficient administrative authority. Thus, the SEC can act more
quickly and more decisively to protect investors and maintain high investor
confidence in the securities industry.
D. Updating Securities Laws to Cover Bank Securities Activities
One of the more formidable obstacles Congress must overcome to implement
comprehensive banking is the tremendous regulatory overlap which could accom-
pany expanded securities activities by banks.' The Board and the Comptroller
under which it was made, false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has
omitted to state in any such application or report any material fact which is required
to be stated therein; or
(4) has failed to reasonably supervise, within the meaning of section 15(b)(4)(E) of
this title, with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules
and regulations, another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is
subject to his supervision;
and that such penalty is in the public interest.
Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1990).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1990).
113. These provisions of SERA covering the cease and desist authority of the SEC are similar
for violations of both the '33 Act and '34 Act.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a), (c) (1990). The applicability of the temporary order is limited to a
respondent who acted "at the time of the alleged misconduct ... as a broker, dealer, investment
adviser, investrpent company, municipal securities dealer, government securities broker, government
securities dealer, or transfer agent, or is, or was at the time of the alleged misconduct, an associated
person of, or a person seeking to become associated with, any of the foregoing." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
3(c)(2) (1990).
115. See EXPANDED BAcx PowERs, supra note 8, at Appendix D for a comparison of the different
substantive regulations between banks and securities firms and the attendant disadvantages if banks
are not made subject to the same regulations as securities firms. The SEC attempted to have banks
included in the definition of broker-dealer under the '34 Act and thus required to register with the
SEC. The D.C. Circuit, however, concluded that Rule 3b-9 was "inconsistent with Congressional
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have the primary regulatory responsibility of commercial banks while the SEC
solely governs securities activities." 6 Deference to the SEC under a new regulatory
scheme of comprehensive banking would be necessary to eliminate regulatory
overlap and provided efficient and proper regulation of expanded bank activities.
Moreover, the extent to which securities laws would govern bank securities
activities would be limited to those activities which are not considered traditional
banking activities.
Although ridding the marketplace of excessive regulation, instituting com-
prehensive banking would require Congress to establish a different regulatory
philosophy towards bank capital market activity. Since the securities laws are
concerned with full disclosure, they require that the issuer disclose all necessary
information so investors can make knowledgeable financial decisions, as well as
be aware of SEC enforcement of the securities laws." 7 In contrast, bank regulation
is more concerned with public confidence and the need to protect the public
from unnecessary information by maintaining confidentiality in their regulatory
activities."' The ability to limit the regulatory scope of bank regulators to those
activities which are within the scope of traditional banking activities, and those
bank activities which are within the scope of securities regulation, is necessary
to have the securities and banking laws work together. Otherwise, unfair and
inconsistent regulation would result for banks participating in the securities
industry which would be detrimental to the investor, the banks, and the public." 9
Because banks are, for example, exempt from the definition of broker-dealer
under the '34 Act,1' ° they enjoy savings in their securities activities compared to
other brokers and dealers who must register with the SEC.' 2' Ultimately, "less
stringent regulations faced by banks allow them to respond to market opportu-
nities more quickly and easily than securities firms."1' To properly expand the
capital market activities of banks, the securities laws should take precedence and
govern bank activity in this area.
III. Enacting Comprehensive Banking Legislation
The decision to revise Glass-Steagall and implement comprehensive banking
legislation is one of the most politically sensitive decisions facing Congress today.
intent" and therefore the SEC needed to have Congress amend the '34 Act to include banks within
the definition of broker-dealer. HAZEN, supra note 17, at 399 (citing American Bankers Ass'n v.
S.E.C., 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986) and Note, The Validity of SEC Rule 3b-9 which Requires
Banks to Register as Broker-Dealers, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 989 (1986)).
116.. The primary difference between banking regulation and securities regulation is that banking
regulation is designed to protect "depositors and [to] preserv[e] ... the financial soundness and
stability of banks," while the securities regulation is designed to protect the securities investor.
EXPANDED BANK PowEas, supra note 8, at 36.
117. Id. at 41.
118. Id.
119. The SIA summed up the concern for a consistent regulatory scheme in the following manner:
"Permitting banks to expand their securities activities without comparable regulation cannot be sound
public policy .... [Flailure to subject banks to the same regulation imposed upon non-banks
conducting similar activities would provide them an unfair advantage over their competitors."
EXPANDED BANK PowERs, supra, note 8, at 42.
120. U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1988).
121. EXPANDED BANK PowERssupra note 8, at 43.
122. Id.
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In the wake of an unprecedented collapse of the savings and loan industry, many
feel that allowing commercial banks to underwrite and deal in equity securities
will be the commercial banking industry's calling card to follow suit. The banking
community, however, feels the burdens of the Act are causing commercial banks
to loose competitiveness in the constantly changing financial markets. 23 Conse-
quently, the modernization of the financial industry into a world market has left
many American commercial banks behind their world competitors because of the
restrictions of Glass-Steagall. '1 Moreover, the ability of commercial banks to
maintain adequate capital resources to meet the diverse demands of their custom-
ers continues to be hindered by Glass-Steagall. 25 This situation presents Congress
with compelling reasons to pass the necessary reforms to place commercial banks
into the competitive capital markets completely. While opening a new front for
capital investment, Congress would place American commercial banks back into
world competition.
A. Better Regulation from the Proper Regulatory Point of View
The implementation of comprehensive banking must be accompanied by
better regulation instead of deregulation as in the savings and loan industry. The
Board has begun to recognize the needed reforms through approval of applications
by some of the nation's largest commercial banks to engage in expanded securities
activities. 26 These actions by the Board involve some limited underwriting by a
bank holding company subsidiary as long as the subsidiary is separately capitalized
and the underwriting activity does not exceed revenue limits of ten percent of
the total subsidiary's activity. 2 7 The Board also has approved underwriting
123. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 30-34. It is more likely that expanded underwriting activities
would create a new steady "stream" of revenue from new diverse activities which would help banks
in troubled times and boost their earnings in good times. Ultimately, "permitting bank affiliates to
underwrite and deal in corporate securities would increase the system's stability." Id. at 22.
124. Isaac and Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 CATiH. U.L. REv. 281,
294 (1988). "Commercial banks not only are constrained by Glass-Steagall in responding to techno-
logical and market changes [in the form of more demanding all around service] but are facing
increased competition from nonbank financial institutions in the provision of traditional banking
services .... Glass-Steagall has significantly hindered the ability of banks to keep pace with these
changes and has diminished their role in the financial system." Id. at 295. See also TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-23 (discussing the recent declines of American commercial banks in
the world financial community. This decline is believed to be the result of extensive regulation of
American banks which their foreign counterparts do not experience.). See id. Table 10, at XVIII-25
(comparing the services allowed in certain countries based on regulatory freedom or prohibition).
125. The underwriting which the Board has approved for commercial banks includes private
placement of corporate securities, full service brokerage and investment advice, limited underwriting
of corporate debt and equity, commercial paper, municipal bonds, asset-backed securities, and
consumer receivable related securities. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversied
Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REv. 314, 342 (1990). While these
activities have allowed banks to expand the different financial services they may offer, the limits and
restrictions have hindered full benefit from these securities activities. Id.
126. See Limited Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 16 and Bankers Trust New York, supra
note 16.
127. Limited Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 16. Here the Federal Reserve Board approved
applications by J.P. Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust, Citicorp, and Security Pacific to
engage to a limited extent in underwriting and dealing in certain corporate securities through subsidiary
affiliates separate from the bank holding company. The Board recently approved some limited equity
underwriting by bank holding company subsidiaries. The companies, Bankers Trust, Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, and the Royal Bank of Canada, all handle the securities through separate
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activities by securities affiliates of parent commercial banks by liberally inter-
preting section 20 of the Act's "engaged principally" language, and finding that
if a subsidiary does not principally engage in securities underwriting, it will not
violate the Act. 128 This same approach was attempted by Congress in the Proxmire
Financial Modernization Act of 1988 ("Proxmire Act")129 but it failed to pass
in the House despite virtually unanimous support in the Senate. The central
theme, however, was to give bank subsidiaries the ability to engage in broader
securities activities prohibited by banks themselves, provided protective "fire-
walls" were set up inside the corporate structure to separate the two entities. 30
Since Congress did not pass the Proxmire Act, the Board has initiated some
reform through a limited approval of special applications by banks to engage in
expanded securities activities through their affiliates or nonbanking subsidiaries.' 3'
The result, while gaining some financial success for banks, has been "achieved
in a piecemal, inefficient, and often irrational manner.' 32
A better, more uniform approach to the current trend to loosening Glass-
Steagall restrictions case by case should involve direct Congressional reform by
passing new legislation which allow banks greater securities activities under the
guidance of the SEC. One structural approach to expanded securities activities
by banks should involve the separate affiliate concept. This concept, as currently
practiced by most commercial banks engaging in permissible securities activities,
should be adjusted somewhat from complete separation to allowing banks some
interaction with their affiliates while remaining separate to avoid compromising
financial situations. The essence of the affiliate concept is to protect against
"conflicts of interest, unfair competition, and concentration of resources."' 33
While these are real concerns and ones which drive the fundamental notions
behind the Act, the bank affiliate should be allowed to share ministerial functions
with their parent bank. 34 This would allow both efficient and sophisticated
management of the capital market activities of the bank and a degree of
separateness which would assure both Congress and the public that the parent
bank wvas not involved in an imprudent relationship with its affiliate. While the
attempts under the Proxmire Act to accomplish this structure were substantial,
yet unsuccessful, Congress again has the impetus to pass comprehensive banking
legislation in the wake of enacting SERA.
B. Using SERA to Reinforce SEC Authority over Bank Securities Activities
The greater control mechanisms at the SEC's disposal after SERA are the
type of regulatory tools needed to control broader bank securities activities.
affiliates which are completely separate from the bank itself and are not dependent on the bank as
a source of capital or customers. See J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 26, 27 (1990) and
Bankers Trust New York, supra note 16, at 830-31.
128. Bankers Trust New York, supra note 16, at 832.
129. Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CoNG.
REc. S3360-3437 (daily ed. March 30, 1988).
130. Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 302.
131. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132. TaA&suaR REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-19.
133. Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 305.
134. Id. at 306, 308. By sharing ministerial functions small banks with aspirations in the securities
markets would not be automatically excluded if they did not have complex parent-affiliate relationships
established. Again, under SEC jurisdiction, these smaller banks, engaging in broader securities
activities, would be subject to similar securities laws and safe harbors for their securities activities.
See generally, Kaufman and Mote, supra note 19.
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SERA gives the SEC authority to maintain investor confidence in the securities
markets as well as protect the investors from violative conduct before it affects
the investor.' The SEC's new powers under SERA also give the SEC broader
authority to impose civil fines, prohibit a person from serving in an authoritative
position on the board of a company, and issue cease and desist orders halting
possibly violative securities activities. 13 6 Ultimately, this new "in-house" authority
results in greater flexibility to handle all types of securities activities from different
types of financial institutions. Thus, bank participation in capital market activities,
through the affiliate arrangement, would fall under the protective eye of the
SEC, providing regulatory stability and a level playing field among all participants
in the capital markets.
While Congressional revision of Glass-Steagall should be a cautious step, it
is also important to realize that many of the hazards which prompted Congress
to enact the Banking Act of 1933 are now controlled through the securities laws.
The primary concerns of prohibiting use of bank funds in speculative investments
and maintaining the goodwill of the banking industry as a whole have largely
been accomplished, even in light of the savings and loan crisis. The banking
industry today has developed financial resources to generate capital from a diverse
network of capital market activities to help maintain stability, notwithstanding
the restrictions of the Act. Yet banks are unable to enjoy all of the benefits that
accompany full participation in the capital markets because of the barriers of
the Act. Revising Glass-Steagall to allow banks to underwrite and deal in corporate
securities would help to promote new growth through even handed regulation.' 3
Additionally, concerns over bank affiliates participating in imprudent securities
activities from connections with their parent bank would be treated through
firewalls.'38 Congressional deference to the SEC for broader securities activities
by banks would institute a new, streamlined layer of protection insuring that the
concerns which prompted Congress to enact the Act would not go unnoticed. '39
Moreover, the idea of allowing the SEC to control the new securities activities
of banks is a natural step for the shift in regulatory philosophies which would
accompany revising the Act. 4' Linking reforms with a regulatory structure under
the securities laws would provide Congress the assurance that while it may be
135. LEO. HIsTORY, supra note 135, at 1381.
136. See supra notes 104-114 and accompanying text.
137. Bankers Trust, 900 F.2d at 367.
138. The securities affiliate activities Congress found improper amounted to a failure to properly
disclose information, loans to parties to purchase securities from the affiliate, loans to the affiliate
itself, purchase of stock by the affiliate of a company who received a loan from the parent bank,
parent bank purchase of stock from their securities affiliate for the bank's own account, and use by
the securities affiliate of the parent bank's name and personnel. See TREASuRY REPORT, supra note
2, at XVIII-6.
139. Professor Garten has recognized that with new regulation comes new hazards, different
"subtle hazards" than those noted by the Court in Camp. They include the "hazard of inefficient
diversification," the "hazard of inefficient funding," and the "hazard of inefficient management."
Garten, supra note 15, at 336-76. These hazards stem from problems in a bank's "organization,
structure and management that arise when banks diversify into new businesses[,J" and not from
engaging in new activities themselves." Id. at 385. Professor Garten offers a transitional approach
to allow banks into new activities to gauge the impact of these "new" hazards and make the
appropriate adjustments, since the consequences of deregulation are unpredictable. Id. at 385-91.
140. Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 315, n.175, (citing S.1886, § 301). See also notes 9-11
and accompanying text.
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giving banks new powers, it is doing so under the trustful eye of the SEC.'
The broader powers would contribute to growth, stability, and diversity in the
entire financial industry while helping to catapult American banks back into
world competitiveness. By giving the SEC jurisdiction over all securities activities
of banks not considered traditional bank activities, 42 Congress would eliminate
the burden of "dual" regulation guidelines by the SEC and banking agencies. 1
43
The new enforcement procedures under SERA would ensure proper regulatory
authority over a bank's expanded capital market participation. Moreover, the
SEC would have the necessary authority to handle the burden of regulating banks
and their affiliates if they were to enter the securities markets.'"
One important concern regarding changes to the current regulatory structure
involves the ability of the banking agencies to continue to regulate those activities
which qualify as traditional banking activities. Banks should be able to perform
those services which are a part of traditional banking functions, without falling
under the jurisdiction of the SEC. This is the best way to keep the two regulatory
structures separate and to provide banks the necessary assurance against regulatory
overlap when entering the securities market.
IV. Impact of Comprehensive Banking on Banks, Underwriting and Brokerage
Firms, and the Capital Markets
Critics of comprehensive banking legislation fear that it will disrupt an
already fragile banking system that has suffered from ubiquitous savings and
loan failures. While these failures resulted from deregulation, loosening the
restrictions on commercial banks provides a change in regulation to proper
oversight with improved and efficient regulation. 14
Some commentators believe that by the partial approval of some limited
underwriting by bank affiliates, conflicts of interest will exist and it remains what
the regulatory agency can do to limit their negative effect.'" The SEC has adopted
a policy of providing safe harbors for situations which present conflicts of interest
in relatively important securities practices. 4' The safe harbor allows the activity
to continue under tight regulatory control through explicit guidelines in spite of
the conflict of interest. This same type of practice could be expected under a
141. "The securities laws should govern bank securities affiliates in matters relating to investor
protection, potential conflicts [of interest], advertising and disclosure issues, and abusive practices
that are within the realm of the securities laws." Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 315.
142. See supra note 106-114 and accompanying text.
143. Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 314. See American Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739
(D.C. Cir. 1986), wherein the court overruled rule 3b-9 of the SEC also to include banks within the
definition of broker-dealer under the '34 Act. The court recommended to the SEC to get Congress
to pass such legislation directly amending the '34 Act. The amendment, included in the Proxmire
Act, was unsuccessful.
144. It appears Congress has already contemplated this idea by including government securities
brokers-dealers [including commercial banks) in the applicability section of SERA to cease and desist
procedures under the '34 Act amendment. See supra note 113 and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1990).
145. EXPANDED BA~r PowERs, supra note 8, at 13.
146. Peters, Securities Regulation in the Nineties, 9 ANN. REv. BANKINO L. 375, 379 (1990).
147. Some important safe harbors include the private placement safe harbors in Regulation D,
Rules 501-506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-230.506 (1990), and the gun jumping safe harbors for broker-
dealers in rules 137-139, 17 C.F.R. § 230.137-230.139 (1990).
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revised regulatory structure where Congress gave the SEC jurisdiction over the
securities activities of banks.' 4
More significantly, however, comprehensive banking legislation would pro-
duce a number of important economic benefits to the commercial and investment
banking industry. These benefits include helping the small investor with lower
commissions on underwriting new issues because of greater market competition,
greater accessibility to the market for small investors through familiar and well
established depositor-banker relationships, maintaining the goodwill of the bank-
ing industry with appropriate regulation and separation of securities affiliates,
and increased cash flows from new capital market activities.,4 9 The ultimate effect
of regulatory reform is greater stability in the investment banking world; where
natural synergistic forces coalesce under a more efficient and naturally structured
regulatory system.'50 Thus, institutional regulation-resulting in different regula-
tory requirements for institutions with similar financial activities-would be
eliminated. Traditional banking activities would thus be regulated by the Board,
and securities activities would fall under SEC jurisdiction.
The primary impact of Glass-Steagall revisions allowing commercial banks
broader underwriting authority on world, national, and regional financial markets
would involve greater competition in a highly concentrated securities market.'
Traditionally, profitable underwriting of initial public offerings and secondary
offerings has been concentrated in a small number of underwriting firms, such
as Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Solomon Brothers and
Shearson Lehman.'5 2 The result has been an underwriting business with high costs
with relatively poor access to the public markets. By allowing commercial banks
to enter the underwriting business without limits on their securities business,'" 3
competition would increase creating a "level playing field" in the underwriting
industry.' s4 By removing barriers such as the amount of nonbanking activity an
affiliate may engage in, or the high degree of separateness required by Glass-
Steagall between banks and their affiliates, Congress would remove many of the
causes of high costs on innovative financial services.'"
In addition to the economic and functional effects of comprehensive banking,
overhauling the Act would have a minimal operational effect on commercial
banks.'16 Commercial banks traditionally engage in numerous underwriting activ-
ities and complex loan placements. Consequently, they have acquired a number
of skills which are very similar to the practices of the investment banker.'1
148. Peters, supra note 146, at 379.
149. Clark and Saunders, Glass-Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and
the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 832-835 (1980).
150. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-27. This system encompasses ridding the banking
industry of duplicative regulation and instituting "functional regulation" so that "largely comparable
activities offered by different financial institutions are regulated on an equivalent basis." Id. at
XVIII-31.
151. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 42.
152. Id. at 30, n.2.
153. Limited Bank Underwriting Decision, supra note 16.
154. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 38.
155. Id.
156. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-14.
157. The risk associated with underwriting and dealing in government and municipal securities is
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Because many of the skills required to be an investment banker are shared
between commercial and investment banking, revising the Act would result in a
relatively smooth transition for commercial banks into broader securities activity.",
V. Conclusion
Revising the Act to allow banks to engage in securities requires a common
sense approach to the current regulatory structure. Comprehensive banking is
required for the American banking industry to raise up and challenge the myriad
of services now offered by foreign banks who are attracting bigger investors.
Similarly, securities firms have become bogged down in the restrictions of section
21 and limits on their ability to provide diversified financial services. "Congres-
sional failure to enact Glass-Steagall reform legislation, however, will ensure a
further weakening of the banking system as banking organizations see their
traditional business erode and their profits shrink in the face of competition for
financial services which they cannot provide under current law."' 5 9
The sophistication of modern financial markets, and a better regulatory
structure under the helmsmenship of the SEC would guide comprehensive banking
down a responsible path.16° Simple deregulation is not the answer, as the savings
and loan debacle proved. Better, more efficient regulation, however, is what
Congress should embrace under the Bush Administration's proposal. The new
powers the SEC has under SERA give it greater in-house power to deal with
violations of the securities laws. Subjecting banks to the securities laws where
the bank engages in securities activities, and not traditional bank activities, would
similar to the risk involved with corporate securities. Moreover, the attendant risks with securities
placement is short and less revealing while "bank lending activities frequently involve credit exposure
for a number of years and relatively illiquid assets." J.P. MoRGAN, supra note 9, at 13. Additionally,
when a underwriter decides to underwrite a particular corporate issue, he has extensive market and
price research to determine the company's credit and commercial health to avoid having to deal with
a sticky issue (one that will not sell). Id. Similarly, commercial banks often have to do the same
type of research with loan participation arrangements and syndications which "require the lead(managing) banks to line up others in the industry to commit beforehand to the assumption of certain
portions of the credits extended." TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at XVIII-14. Commercial banks
repeat this same activity when they engage in private placement activities. Consequently, the business
effect on commercial banks to engage in corporate underwriting would be minimal.
158. Guidance by the SEC will maintain the integrity of the banking system during this transition
to ensure that the failures of the savings and loan industry are not repeated in the commercial
banking industry. The importance of goodwill and reputation to commercial banks would preclude
imprudent banking activities which would exploit possible conflicts of interest in a banking-securities
firm affiliation. J.P. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 29. Additionally, the regulatory framework of the
SEC, with its disclosure requirements and antifraud provisions, enhanced by SERA, provides investors
with the requisite information to make informed decisions on investment, and the necessary deterrence
for potential abuses, as well as the ability to address abuses that do occur. Id.
159. Isaac and Fein, supra note 124, at 318-19.
160. Because the SEC has a sophisticated regulatory structure to deal with the volatile securities
industry, it is they who are best equipped, with their latest weapon SERA, to ensure the proper
implementation of comprehensive banking legislation under efficient regulation.
Congress has designated the SEC, together with the self-regulatory organizations, as the
regulatory authority for the securities business. The SEC's statutory framework, rules,
expertise, and examination and enforcement procedures [enhanced by SERA) - not those
of the banking agencies - are best designed to oversee securities activities and ensure
the protection of investors and the fairness of the securities markets. It is only prudent
that the securities business of banks be subject to this same regulatory system.
EXPANDED BANK POWERS, supra note 8, at 43.
284
Bank Reform
provide the protection to insure commercial banks against failure in the face of
new and expanded securities activities.
Peter N. Farley61
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